A situational theory of pork-barrel politics: The shifting logic of discretionary allocations in india
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Date
2017
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Journal ISSN
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Publisher
India Review
Abstract
Despite the extensive literature on distributive politics, there is
still a lack of a theory of how political and fiscal institutions
interact to shape the pork barreling ability of national leaders in
a federal parliamentary democracy. This article examines how
the party system types (dominant party versus coalition system)
and particular attributes of discretionary grants (providing
credit claiming opportunity or facilitating side payments) influence
opportunities for pork-barrel politics. This article proposes
a situational theory of distributive politics that states that incentives
for exclusive targeting of affiliated states in one-party
dominant systems drive national ruling parties toward particularism
while the shrinking opportunity to indulge in such a
policy in multiparty coalition systems creates a universalization
effect. The disaggregated analysis of discretionary grants using
Indian data for 14 states for the one-party dominant period
(1972–89) and the coalition era (1996–2012) confirms the theoretical
expectations. Additionally, the exercise brings to the fore
the fact that the shift from particularism to universalism occurs
for schematic grants that provide credit claiming opportunity.
The ad hoc grants that are like side payments remain subject to
particularism.